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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Henry Weliever appeals the district court's order denying his motion to suppress
evidence found after police officers impounded and conducted a warrantless search of his car,
and the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. He asserts the district court erred
in upholding the search under the inventory-search exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement because, contrary to the district court's findings, the officers did not conduct
the inventory search in compliance with the established police procedures.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 23, 2018, a Mini-Cassia Sherriffs Deputy, Detective Shane Murphy, observed
Mr. Weliever driving a Mercury Topaz. (R., p.63.) The detective knew Mr. Weliever had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest, and decided to stop and arrest him. (Tr., p.45, L. 18 - p.46,
L.9.)

Upon making contact, Detective Murphy informed Mr. Weliever he was under arrest

pursuant to the warrant and took him into custody. (R. p.63.) Mr. Weliever had his friend's two
dogs in the car with him, and he called the friend to come and get them. (Tr., p.125, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Weliever's vehicle was uninsured and it had license plates that did not match the car and
were "fictitious." (R., p.63; Tr., p.47, Ls.7-15, p.135, Ls.6-10.) A second officer, Detective Matt
Love, arrived at the scene to assist Detective Murphy. (Tr., p.56, Ls.14-17.) A transport officer
also arrived and took Mr. Weliever to the county jail. (Tr., p.60, Ls.7-8.)
The detectives decided to impound Mr. Weliever's vehicle and called for a tow truck.
(R., p.65; Tr., p.53, L.20 - p.54, L.6.) In the meantime, Mr. Weliever's friend arrived at the
scene and collected her dogs, and the officers also let her take several bags of clothing she
claimed belonged to her. (Tr., p.46, L.10 - p.63, Ls.8-15.) After the friend had left, and before
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the tow truck arrived, the officers searched through Mr. Weliever's vehicle. (Tr., p.49, L.7 p.50, L.16.) During the search, Officer Love found a brown Carhartt-style coat, searched inside
the coat's pocket, and seized a syringe containing a liquid substance. (Tr., p.29, Ls.5-12, p.53,
Ls.19-24.)
The officers also completed an impound vehicle inventory log sheet listing some, but not
all, of the items found inside the vehicle. (Tr., p.61, Ls.16-22.) According to the officers, they
were "looking for items of value ... just anything that we feel like needs to be listed." (Tr., p.61,
L.16- p.62, L.9.) The items listed on the inventory log sheet are as follows:
FISHING POLES, DOGS, MISC. TRASH, LEATHERMAN, I.D.S, SOCIAL
SECURITY CARD, 3 PHONES, MULTIPLE CELL PHONES, Misc. Tools.
(Ex., p.8.) The officers specially listed the "syringe" as a "retained" item. (Ex., p.8.) No other
items - not even the Carhartt-style coat- were listed on the inventory sheet. (See Ex., p.8.)
The liquid substance in the syringe was later tested and determined to be
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-24.) A few months after the original stop and vehicle
search, Mr. Weliever was charged with possession of methamphetamine, and another warrant
was issued. (See R., p.63; Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.13, L.9.) On September 19, 2018, Officer Love
arrested Mr. Weliever pursuant to that warrant, and during the search incident thereto, discovered
a baggie of methamphetamine on Mr. Weliever's person. (See Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.13, L.9.) The
State filed a three-count Information, charging Mr. Weliever with possessing methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia on July 23, 2018 (the original stop and vehicle search); and with
possessing methamphetamine on September 19, 2018 (the subsequent arrest on the warrant).
(R., p.20.)
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Mr. Weliever filed a motion to suppress,1 claiming the warrantless search of his vehicle
on July 23, 2018, violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(R., pp.45-48.) He argued the "inventory exception" did not apply in this case because: (1) the
officers had unreasonably impounded his car; and (2) the officers did not comply with the
established police policy. (R., pp.45-48; Tr., p.43, L.12 - p.154, L.18.) He argued that the
exclusionary rule required suppression of all direct and indirect evidence as the tainted fruit of
the officers' unlawful conduct, including the evidence discovered as the result of his arrest on
September 19, 2018. (R., pp.45-48; Tr., p.9, L.21-p.13, L.9.)
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a written order denying
Mr. Weliever's motion. (R. pp.63-68.) The district concluded that: (a) the officers' decision to
impound the vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances; and (b) the officers listed the
valuable items in the car on the inventory sheet, and that in so doing, conducted the search
consistently with standardized inventory-search police procedures. (R., pp.67-68.) Mr. Weliever
filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the district court to re-examine its order concerning the
inventory search, in light of the transcript of the preliminary hearing and additional argument.
(R. pp.99-102.) The district court denied the motion to reconsider, ruling that the evidence in the
preliminary transcript was merely cumulative. (R., pp.104-05.)
Mr. Weliever, entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possessmg
methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the district court's orders denying his motion to
suppress and motion to reconsider. (R., p.110; Tr., p.173, L.24 - p.182, L.7.) The district court
entered a judgment of conviction sentencing him to seven years, with two years fixed.
(R., p.130.) Mr. Weliever timely filed a Notice of Appeal. (Tr., p.138.)
1

References to the Motion to Suppress refer to the Amended Motion to Suppress filed
January 18, 2019. (See R., pp.45-48.)
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in failing to suppress the evidence gathered m violation of
Mr. Weliever's Fourth Amendment rights?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Evidence Gathered In Violation Of
Mr. Weliever's Fourth Amendment Rights

A.

Introduction
The police officers violated Mr. Weliever's Fourth Amendment rights when they

conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle. The district erred when it ruled that the search
was valid under the inventory-search exception, because, contrary to the district court's findings,
the officers did not conduct the search in compliance with the standard and established police
procedures. 2 Suppression should have been granted.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When this Court reviews

an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, it accepts the trial court's factual fmdings
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 512 (2010). However, this
Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of those
facts. State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 242 (2016).

C.

The Officers' Warrantless Vehicle Search Violated Mr. Weliever's Fourth Amendment
Rights
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it
falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

2

Mr. Weliever does not challenge the district court's ruling that the impound of the vehicle was
reasonable under the circumstances.
5

454-55 (1971). "In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a
specific exception to the warrant requirement." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
In this case, the search of Mr. Weliever's car was a warrantless search, and the burden
was on the State to establish that an exception to the warrant requirement applied. State v.
LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 839 (2004). As demonstrated below, the State failed to carry its burden.

1.

The Inventory-Search Exception Does Not Apply In This Case Because The
Officers Did Not Comply With The Established Police Policy

The authorization for warrantless inventory searches "is based on the principle that an
inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an
inventory." Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). As described by the Court of Appeals:
Inventory searches are a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. The legitimate purposes of inventory searches are: (1)
protect the owner's property while it remains in police custody; (2) protect the
State against false claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protect police from
potential danger. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for general
rummaging in order to locate incriminating evidence. "Inventory searches, when
conducted in compliance with standard and established police procedures and not
as a pretext for criminal investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

For the inventory-search exception to apply, the State must show the search was
conducted in compliance with standard and established police procedures and was not used as a
pretext, that is, not used in bad faith. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 387, 373 n.6 (1987)
("Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according
to standardized criteria.").
In this case, as found by the district court, the Minidoka County Sheriffs Office has a
standardized written policy governing vehicle inventory searches, which is the policy contained
6

in the Idaho Policing Policy, updated July 1, 2017. (R., p. 66; Ex.5; Tr., 51, L.11-p.52, L.23.)
That written standardized policy provides, in relevant part:

Vehicle inventory searches
Whenever you impound a vehicle, you should conduct a vehicle inventory search
in accordance with this policy. The purpose of this type of search is [1] to protect
the owner's property from damage or loss while the vehicle is in law enforcement
custody, [2] to protect you and our agency against claims of lost, damaged or
stolen property, and [3] to protect our agency from potential dangers of property
stored in the vehicle.

Failure to complete the inventory search may render the search invalid.
[emphasis original.]
Special Procedure: Fill out a vehicle search inventory log that includes the date
and time of the search and a detailed inventory of the vehicle's contents. You
should search any location in the vehicle where you could reasonably expect to
discover valuables or other items for safekeeping.

Remove any hazardous or potentially dangerous item, or any valuable item that
could potentially be lost or damaged, and store in a safe manner.
(Ex.pp.6-7 (emphasis added).)
This standardized written policy was not complied with in this case.

Although the

officers filled out an inventory log, they failed to include a "detailed inventory of the vehicle's
contents," and they failed to do so despite the emphatic written warning that "Failure to

complete the inventory search may render the search invalid."
Instead, on the inventory log, the officers listed the following items:
FISHING POLES, DOGS, MISC. TRASH, LEATHERMAN, I.D.S, SOCIAL
SECURITY CARD, 3 PHONES, MULTIPLE CELL PHONES, Misc. Tools.
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(Ex., p.8.) Also included was the syringe, noted as a "retained" item. (Ex., p.8.) The officers
included no other items on the inventory log - not even the Carhartt coat in which the syringe
had been found. (See Ex., p.8.)
This inventory demonstrates that the officers failed to comply with the written policy's
standards. As testified to by the officers and found by the district court, the officers did not
include a complete list of all items. (Tr., p.61, Ls.16-22.) Although both of the officers were
vague and non-committal in their respective assessments of the quantity of items in the vehicle
(see Tr., p.41, Ls.19- p.43, L.9), the district court accepted as fact that the officers had left items

out of the inventory. (R., p.67.)
The district court found that the officers had nonetheless complied with the policy since
"they listed those items which they believed to have value." (R., p.67 (emphasis added).) This
finding was erroneous. First, the finding is, factually, clearly erroneous, and not supported by the
evidence,3 since the officers also included "MISC. TRASH." (Ex., p.8.) Moreover, a finding
that the officers included items of value does not mean that all items of value were listed.
Critically, the officers did not testify they had in fact conducted thorough search of the vehicle,
or looked through all its containers, in search of items of value, as required by the policy. (See
generally Tr., p.5, L.2 - p.66, L.23.) On the contrary, the officers testified they spent little time -

five or ten minutes - inventorying the contents of the vehicle. (Tr., p.76, Ls.8-10.)
Additionally, the written policy does not state that only items of value need to be included
in the inventory; rather, the policy plainly instructs officers to include a "detailed description of
the contents." (Ex., p.8.) Thus, while inventorying valuable items may be consistent with the
second of the policy's three stated purposes, i.e., "to protect you and our agency against claims
3

Factual fmdings that are not supported by the record are clearly erroneous and cannot be used
to support a trial court's decision. See e.g., Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814 (1994).
8

of lost, damaged or stolen property," it does not fulfill the first purpose, which is "to protect the
owner's property from damage or loss while the vehicle is in law enforcement custody." (Ex.,
p.8.) Mr. Weliever had been living out of his car, and kept clothing and other numerous items of
personal property with him, which certainly had value to him even if not apparent to the officers.
(Tr., p.107, Ls.2-10.)
Not only did the officers fail to list all of the items found in the vehicle, they falsely listed
items that were not in the vehicle, specifically "DOGS." (Ex., p.8.) Listing items removed from
the vehicle prior to towing would contravene the second supposed purpose of inventory searches.
(See Ex., p.7.)

Finally, the district court erred in ruling that Mr. Weliever was required to show bad faith
by the police (R., pp.67), and its reliance on the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Bray, 122
Idaho 375 (Ct. App. 1992), was misplaced. For the inventory-search exception to apply, the
search must: (1) be conducted in compliance with standard and established police procedures
and (2) not be used as a pretext, that is, not be used in bad faith. See Colorado v. Bertine, 4 79

U.S. 387, 373 n.6 (1987) ("Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that
inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.").

Thus, because the inventory

search must satisfy both requirements, in order for suppression to succeed, the defendant need
only show that either the search was not consistent with established procedures, or it was
pretextual.
In Bray, the defendant complained the officer's inventory "was not complete, in that [the
officer] did not list all of the items found." 122 Idaho at 379. However, and in contrast to the
facts of Mr. Weliever's case, in Bray there was no written police policy or other established
police standard that instructed officers to include a complete listing of all items in the inventory.
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Id. On the contrary, the officer in Bray testified as to the purpose of the policy, and that he had

conducted the inventory in accordance with that purpose. Id. Moreover, as noted in the Bray
Court's decision, the defendant failed to introduce the inventory log produced by the officer, and
also failed to show that the officer's list did not comply with the policy's purpose. Id. Thus, in
Bray, the State showed that the officer in fact complied with the established policy, and the

inventory search was therefore proper in the absence of a showing of officer bad faith. Id.
While an officer's noncompliance with the provisions of an inventory policy can
demonstrate improper motives, an officer's noncompliance with the policy is not equivalent to
bad faith; likewise, bad faith can exist even where the policy has been strictly followed. See
United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).

In short, to justify the search, the State bore the burden to show the inventory search was
conducted both in compliance with standard and established police procedures and not as a
pretext for criminal investigation. Stewart, 152 Idaho at 868. Because the State failed to show
that the inventory search complied with the established written procedure, the district court
clearly erred in concluding the procedure was followed.

The district court's order denying

suppression should be reversed.
2.

Mr. Weliever Is Entitled To Suppression Of Both The Direct And Indirect Fruit
Of The Officers' Unlawful Conduct

Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary
rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded from trial. See, e.g., State v.
Cohagen, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). The

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both "primary evidence obtained as a direct result
of an illegal search or seizure," and "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an
illegality," the proverbial '"fruit of the poisonous tree."' Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721 (quoting
10

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)) (emphasis added). The rule "extends as well
to the indirect as the direct products of unconstitutional conduct." Segura, 468 U.S. at 804.
There are, of course, exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule. Cohagan,
162 Idaho at 721 (citing Utah v. Strieff, _ U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016)). However, the burden
rests with the State to argue and establish there was "sufficient attenuation" to break the causal
connection between the officer's illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
In this case, the methamphetamine and the syringe found on July, 23, 2018, during the
search of Mr. Weliever's vehicle, was discovered as the direct result of the officers' unlawful
conduct. However, that unlawfully-seized evidence was then used by Officer Love to supply the
probable cause to obtain the warrant on which the officer later, on September 19, 2018, arrested
and searched Mr. Weliever, discovering the additional drugs on his person.

(R., pp.45-48;

Tr., p.9, L.21 -p.13, L.9.)
Additionally, because in the district court, the State failed even to argue the application of
any exception to the exclusionary rule, the State has waived the issue. State v. Hoskins, 165
Idaho 217, _, 443 P.3d 231, 240 (2019) (rejecting the State's request for a remand to determine
the application of exceptions to exclusionary rule, where the State had failed to argue any
exception in the district court).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Weliever respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
to allow him to withdraw his conditionally-entered guilty plea, in accordance with the plea
agreement.
DATED this 29 th day of April, 2020.

I sf Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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